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Abstract
This paper constructs a macro-nance model with two types of borrowers: en-
trepreneurs who engage in productive activities and gamblers who play in lotteries.
It links a central bank's interest rate policy to expected cash ows of both types of
borrowers. Via this link we study how the interactions between various shocks and
dierent monetary policy rules aect the quality of the borrower pool faced by nancial
intermediaries. We nd that if the economy is hit by an expansionary monetary policy
shock, in the long run the proportion of entrepreneurs in the borrower pool will be
persistently lower than the steady state level. This worsening of the borrower pool is
more serious if the central bank does not react to output uctuations. By contrast,
not reacting to output uctuations in case of a negative productivity shock avoids a
persistent worsening of the borrower pool in the long run.
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Taylor (2009) suggests that government policies could be sources of nancial crises. In
this paper, we focus on the impact of one particular type of government policy, central
bank's interest rate policy, on nancial stability. More specically, we investigate how the
interactions between various shocks and central bank's interest rate rules dynamically aect
the adverse selection problem faced by nancial intermediaries.
To that end, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model with two types of borrowers.
One is a gambler who borrows to invest in a xed-supply gambling asset. The other is an
entrepreneur who borrows to pay the set-up cost for production. Borrowers are protected
by the limited liability law. Limited liability together with xed-supply can generate a
bubble in the gambling asset market (Allen and Gale, 2000). When there is a bubble,
lending to gamblers generates expected losses.1 In this case, there are two reasons why
the gamblers still get loans from nancial intermediaries (Barlevy, 2008). First, lending to
entrepreneurs generates expected prots. Second, there is no screening between gamblers
and entrepreneurs.2 Without screening in the nancial intermediation sector, a persistent
decrease in the proportion of entrepreneurs in the borrower pool can accumulate huge losses
for nancial intermediaries. This paper links the central bank's interest rate policy to changes
in the borrower pool in a general equilibrium framework. More specically, a change in the
interest rate aects liabilities of both types of borrowers in the same way, but aects the
payos of the assets they buy in a dierent way. On the one hand, the payo of the gambling
asset is exogenously determined by the lotteries. On the other hand, the payos of the rms
set up by the entrepreneurs are endogenously determined by a number of factors including
the interest rate. Therefore, a change in the interest rate can disproportionately change
1See proof in section 2.2.
2Empirical studies (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2003; Bertoni et al., 2011) suggest that even venture capital
rms which are supposed to have a strong ability to select good borrowers do not really select good rms.
Reinhart and Rogo (2009) suggest that the expansion of the nancial intermediation sector in the run-up
to crises causes overcapacity in the nancial industry. Since many new intermediaries enter the market
with less experience during the expansionary period, one should expect a weaker average ability to screen
the borrowers. Moreover, the theoretical model of Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) suggests that nancial
intermediaries will optimally choose not to screen the borrowers if the number of new loan applicants is
suciently large.
2the expected cash ows for gamblers and entrepreneurs. The dierence in the changes of
expected cash ows leads to a dierence in the entry decisions which changes the proportion
of entrepreneurs in the borrower pool.
The key result of our model is that the central bank's interest rate policy can reduce the
riskiness of the loan portfolio in the short run, while persistently increase the riskiness in
the long run. More specically, by lowering the interest rate, the central bank makes debt
repayment easier for both entrepreneurs and gamblers. This encourages entry of both types of
investors. Our quantitative analysis suggests that entry of entrepreneurs may increase more
than entry of gamblers in the short run, which means that the proportion of entrepreneurs
in the pool of new loan applicants increases in the short run. Since loans to entrepreneurs
are less risky than loans to gamblers, the loan portfolio becomes less risky in the short run.
However, more entry of entrepreneurs intensies competition in the production sector and
reduces future prots of the producers. This deters entrepreneurial entry in the long run. By
contrast, future payos of the lotteries are exogenously determined and are not aected by
the current-period entry of gamblers.3 Therefore, the proportion of entrepreneurs persistently
stays at low levels in the long run.
Taylor (2009) argues that deviations from the Taylor rule can be a source of nancial crisis.
We nd that expansionary monetary policy shocks can persistently worsen the borrower pool
faced by nancial intermediaries in the long run. This is consistent with Taylor's argument.
However, quantitative results of our model also suggest that sticking to the Taylor rule is
not sucient to eliminate nancial crises. Actually, if the economy is hit by a negative
productivity shock, a central bank which deviates from the Taylor rule by not reacting to
output uctuations can reduce the long-run nancial risk.
The nancial accelerator model (Bernanke et al., 1999) also links productivity shocks
to nancial intermediation in a general equilibrium macroeconomic framework.4 However,
3Competition can push up the price of the gambling asset. However, it also pushes up the cost of entering
the production sector, which increases the value of the rms. Therefore, competition-induced changes in
asset prices are limited in relative terms. As a result, the eect of such changes in relative asset prices on the
proportion of entrepreneurs is also limited.
4See Allen and Gale (2007) for a survey of partial equilibrium models which also link real shocks to
nancial stability.
3there is no distinctive dierence between the short-run and long-run eects of shocks in the
nancial accelerator model. As we discussed, the distinction between the short run and
long run is important. Moreover, the nancial accelerator model considers only one type
of borrower (the entrepreneur) and assumes that the number of entrepreneurs is xed. Our
model instead features endogenous entry of both gamblers and entrepreneurs. It enables us
to study the dynamic changes in the borrower pool faced by nancial intermediaries.
Our modeling of the production sector is related to the macroeconomic model with en-
dogenous rm entry by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008), but diers in
several important respects. In Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008), there is
no nancial friction and therefore no role for nancial intermediation. In our model, there is
nancial friction and rms must rely on nancial intermediaries to buy goods necessary to
start their business. This enables us to study the feedback from the real sector to the nan-
cial sector. In Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008), rms exit exogenously at
a constant rate. In our model, the exit of rms is endogenously determined by their ability
to repay their debt. One particularly important dierence is that nominal wage is sticky
in our model whereas it is exible in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008).
Bilbiie et al. (2008) nd that entrepreneurial entry initially decreases after an expansionary
monetary policy shock. This is because output expansion created by the interest rate shock
pushes up the real wage. The higher real wage not only makes entrepreneurial entry more
costly but also decreases prots after entry. Therefore, fewer entrepreneurs want to enter.
However, as suggested by Rotemberg (2008), if the nominal wage is sticky, the rise in the
real wage will be more modest. As a result, prots could rise rather than fall. Therefore,
entrepreneurial entry can rise despite the increase in entry cost. Since entrepreneurial entry
aects the borrower pool faced by nancial intermediaries, it is crucial to model wage setting
in a more realistic way.
A popular claim in media and policy discussions is that speculation in the secondary
nancial market is a source of nancial crisis. Very often this claim is used to justify nancial
suppression, for example through restrictions on secondary market trading. While re sales
4in the secondary market can trigger a nancial crisis (Allen and Gale, 2004, 2007), banning
secondary market trading is far from a justied solution to prevent nancial crises. Our model
suggests that productivity shocks originating from the real sector can lead to a nancial crisis
even if there is a ban on secondary market trading of the gambling asset.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces the model; Section 3 solves the model; Section
4 displays and discusses impulse responses of the model under dierent shocks; Section 5
studies the robustness of the qualitative results to sticky interest rate passthrough. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
To facilitate the comparison of impulse responses in our model to those in the standard lit-
erature, we incorporate nominal and real frictions (price stickiness, wage stickiness, habit
formation) in the standard new Keynesian models into our model. Aggregation is very
dicult if we have both price stickiness and endogenous entry and exit of rms in one sec-
tor. Therefore, we separate those two features into two dierent sectors. First, we have a
consumption goods sector with sticky prices and xed mass of rms. Second, we have an
intermediate goods sector with exible prices and endogenous entering and exiting of rms.
The consumption goods producers use intermediate goods for production while the interme-
diate goods producers use labor for production. Entering entrepreneurs in the intermediate
goods sector must hire labor and buy consumption goods to set up their rms. The entry
cost in terms of wage payment is covered by the shareholders or households. The entry cost
in terms of consumption goods is covered by loans from the nancial intermediaries. Besides
entrepreneurs, nancial intermediaries also face another type of borrower, the gambler. Gam-
blers use the borrowed amount to buy an asset of which the payo is completely exogenously
determined by lotteries. In each period, nancial intermediaries receive an installment repay-
ment from the borrowers if there is no default. Households make decisions on labor supply,
consumption, investment in deposits and new stocks of rms in the intermediate goods sec-
5tor. They receive prots and wage payments from the rms and interest payments from the
nancial intermediaries. Finally, there is a central bank which sets nominal money market
interest rates. Figure 1 summarizes the interrelationships between the agents.
2.1 Firms
2.1.1 Consumption Goods Producers
There is a continuum of symmetric monopolistically competitive producers for the consump-
tion goods, each producing a dierentiated variety z 2 (0;1).5 The production function of
rm z is yt(z) = Xt(z), where Xt(z) is the amount of aggregate intermediate goods employed
in the consumption goods production process of rm z.








, where  2 (1;1) is the elasticity of substitution across the consumption
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1  is the ideal consumer price
index (CPI).
We assume there is price inertia in the consumption goods sector. More specically, we
follow Rotemberg (1982) and Bilbiie et al. (2008) to assume that the consumption goods
producer z has to pay a price setting cost of the form pact(z) =

2 [t(z)   1]
2 pt(z)yt(z),
where  2 [0;1) and t(z) 
pt(z)
pt 1(z) is rm z's gross price ination. Following Erceg et al.
(2000), we assume that there is a subsidy c = 1
 1 to the rm's output so that the distortion
from monopolistic competition in the consumption goods sector is eliminated.6 Therefore,
5The xed number of varieties has been normalized to unity.
6One purpose of introducing the subsidies in the model is to facilitate comparison of the quantitative results
with those of Bilbiie et al. (2008) since they introduce a government subsidy to eliminate distortion from
monopolistic competition in their model. Moreover, given that the distortion from monopolistic competition
is eliminated, the central bank's monetary policy only has to concern about frictions from nominal rigidities
and the nancial sector.
6rm z's periodic real prot is
m
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t is the price index of the aggregate intermediate goods, and the second equality
comes from our specication of the consumption goods production function.
Firm z chooses a price level to maximize the net present value (NPV) of the prot
ows Et1
s=t[t;smc
s(z)], where t;s  s t(UCs=UCt) is the stochastic discount factor,  is
the subjective discount factor and UCs is the marginal utility of consumption in period s.
Following Bilbiie et al. (2008), we interpret the real price setting cost as the amount of
marketing materials needed to set the price and assume that the basket of the marketing
materials has the same composition as the consumption basket. Therefore, the demand
function for rm z's goods is yt(z) = [
pt(z)
PC
t ] Yt. Maximizing the NPV of rm z's prot ows
subject to the demand function, we obtain the optimal pricing condition for the consumption
good producer rm z: pt(z) = t(z)P M

































t 1 is the gross consumer price ination rate. Note that in the steady state
with no price adjustment, the markup is one. This is because the monopolistic distortion is
eliminated by the production subsidy.
Imposing symmetry, it is easy to see that the producer price ination rate of the con-
sumption goods sector is also the CPI ination rate. More specically, when producers








1  = pt, where pt = pt(z) is the average producer price in the consumption
goods sector.
72.1.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Similar to the consumption goods production sector, the intermediate goods production
sector also features monopolistic competition. However, dierent from the consumption
goods sector, we assume that the number of varieties of the intermediate goods can change
over time due to free entry and exit. More specically, we assume that there is a continuum
of intermediate goods producers, each producing a dierent variety ! 2 
. A basket of the









, where  2 (1;1) is
the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. Hence, the individual intermediate




t ] Xt, where pm








1  is the aggregate price index of the intermediate goods.
Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), we assume that the production function of the
intermediate goods rm ! is xt(!) = !Ztlt(!), where lt(!) is the labor input for production,
Zt is the stochastic aggregate productivity level, ! is the individual productivity level which
is drawn after entry and remains xed thereafter. Hence, the unit labor cost for intermediate
goods production is wt=!Zt, where wt is the aggregate real wage rate. We assume that there is
no price adjustment cost in the intermediate goods sector. Similar to the consumption goods
sector, there is an output subsidy m = 1
 1 so that distortion from monopolistic competition
is eliminated. Given those assumptions, the real gross prot function of the intermediate
goods rm ! is




= [(1 + m)p
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!Zt , due to the subsidy; the third equation is the result of substituting in the




t ] Xt. Obviously, rms with a higher individual productivity
! earns more prot.
82.1.3 Aggregation, Entry and Exit of Intermediate Goods Producers
To enter the market, the intermediate goods producers have to pay a sunk cost. The sunk cost
is composed of two parts. One part is an amount of eective labor cost (wt
Ztfew) covered by the
rm's own money.7 The other part is the cost of purchasing a xed amount (fe) of aggregate
consumption goods covered by loans from nancial intermediaries. The loan is then repaid
by installments in each period. As we shall see in subsection 2.2, the periodic installment
(ft) is predetermined and unaected by an individual rm's productivity. This suggests that
the probability that rm ! is able to pay the full amount of installment is higher when its
individual productivity ! is higher. Therefore, there is a cuto individual productivity level
!
t which satises mt(!
t) = ft. Note that we add a time subscript to the cuto individual
productivity as the cuto level varies with aggregate productivity. We assume that rms
that fail to pay the full amount of the installment will go bankrupt. This assumption implies
that the bankruptcy law imposes a strict solvency constraint on the borrowers so that all
defaulting borrowers will be forced to go bankrupt even if some of them may be able to repay
the debt in the future, once the aggregate economic situation has become more favorable.
In practice, bankruptcy laws dier across countries. For example, bankruptcy laws in the
UK are much stricter than in the US. In the US, there is Chapter 11 which allows the rms
in nancial distress to reorganize and continue to operate afterward. We do not model this
for tractability reasons. However, the existence of a soft budget constraint is likely to deter
the entry of entrepreneurs and worsen the borrower pool faced by nancial intermediaries,
since keeping more rms in the market could reduce expected prot ows for an entering
entrepreneur. Moreover, a soft budget constraint could encourage gambling since it gives
gamblers a better chance to survive longer and benet more from taking the gamble. In this
sense, introducing a soft budget constraint may strengthen rather than weaken the results
of the current model. We further assume that there is limited liability which means that
the rms do not have to pay an amount more than its prot to the lender when bankrupt.
Therefore, those rms which expect to earn prots less than the installment will exit the
7More precisely, it is indirectly covered by the households owning the rms.
9market without production since they can earn nothing from producing. This is dierent
from the traditional nancial accelerator model (Bernanke et al., 1999) in which the rms'
current period prot is modeled as a collateral for the loan. However, it is consistent with
the theoretical model of Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) which suggests that if the number
of new loan applications is suciently large, nancial intermediaries will optimally choose
not to screen the borrowers and require no collateral from them. With the assumptions we
introduced, we can aggregate the intermediate goods production sector in the same way as
Melitz (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005) have done. More specically, we assume that
the intermediate goods producers draw their individual productivity levels from a Pareto
distribution G(!) = 1   (1=!)k over [1;1). Then an average productivity level dened as
!
m













can summarize all the information on the individual productivity distributions relevant for
all macroeconomic variables. Essentially, the intermediate goods producer block of our model
with Nt rms with heterogeneous productivity is isomorphic to one where Nt representative
rms with productivity !m







t ), which is a result of Melitz (2003).
Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008), we assume that there is a
time-to-build lag such that the rms start producing only one period after paying the sunk
cost. Firms with an individual productivity level higher than !
t will not go bankrupt, so
the rm survival rate in period t is t  1   G(!
t) = (1=!
t)k. Therefore, an entering rm's




s )   fs]g. Free entry in the
intermediate goods production sector requires that the average value of the rm equals the




Denoting the number of new entrants in the intermediate goods sector by Ne
t , we get the
10dynamic equation for the number of producing rms: Nt = t(Nt 1 + Ne
t 1).
2.2 Financial Intermediation
In each period, there are a number (Nr
t ) of investors who come to the nancial intermediaries
for funding. A proportion t = Ne
t =Nr
t of those investors are entrepreneurs who will invest
the borrowed money in the intermediate goods sector to start their business. The other
(1   t)Nr
t investors are gamblers who will invest the borrowed money on a pure gambling
asset of which the supply is xed for each period. The loan from the intermediaries is paid
back by a periodic installment (fs) from one period after the borrowing. We introduce the
one-period lag here to allow for a time-to-build lag in the real sector. We assume that the
nancial intermediaries do not screen out gamblers from the borrower pool. As a result,
the borrowing amount and periodic repayment will be the same for both entrepreneurs and
gamblers. Therefore, the borrowed money of a gambler in period t is fe which is equal to
the part of sunk cost of an intermediate goods producer covered by a loan from the nancial
intermediaries.
One period after purchase, the buyer of the gambling asset can participate in a lottery,
which gives a payo g with probability  and a payo zero with probability 1 . Conditional
on winning the lottery, the owner of the gambling asset can participate in the same lottery
again in the next period. The gambler can keep participating in the lottery until he fails to
win the lottery. Denote the real gambling asset price by pr
t. Then the number of gambling
asset bought by a gambler is
fe
pr
t . Similar to the entrepreneurs, gamblers will go bankrupt
if they cannot pay the full amount of installment, and their prot is zero when bankrupt










t   fs)]g, where Prob(x) denotes the probability
11of event x.8 Assuming that the gamblers have to pay an entrance fee9 (fg) for the gambling










t   fs)]g = fg.
Assuming that g is large enough so that g
fe
pr













Following Allen and Gale (2000), we dene the fundamental value of the gambling asset as
the NPV of the returns from the gambling asset when the gamblers have to buy it with their
own money. More specically, the fundamental value is gEt[1




s=t+1(t;ss tfs)] > 1, the real asset price is larger than its fundamental value.
This reects the idea of Allen and Gale (2000) that excessive risk-taking behavior induced
by the limited liability law can create asset price bubbles. More specically, for bubbles to
exist, entry into the real sector must be more dicult than entry into the gambling sector,
i.e., fe > fg must hold. Additionally, the NPV of expected repayments from the gambler
(Et[1
s=t+1(t;ss tfs)]) must be relatively small compared to the amount borrowed (fe). This
suggests that lending to a gambler cannot be good business for the nancial intermediaries
if there is a bubble in the gambling asset price. However, even in this case, the nancial
intermediaries may still be willing to lend to loan applicants because expected returns from
lending to the entrepreneurs could cover the expected losses from lending to the gamblers.
To facilitate impulse response analysis later, we dene DV1t  Et[1
s=t+1(t;ss t)] and
DV2t  Et[1
s=t+1(t;ss tfs)]. These two denitions can be written in recursive forms:
8Here the analysis is simplied by assuming that the investors cannot sell the assets in a secondary
market. In other words, they are locked up after purchasing. Ofek and Richardson (2003) provide evidence
that lockup agreements are responsible for the buildup of the internet bubble. In practice, the gamblers
could be the existing business owners who starts excessively risky new projects with easy money from the
nancial intermediaries. Typically, selling of the projects involves very high liquidation costs. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume no resale of those assets. The lockup assumption is a very stringent form of short sale
constraint. Our intuition is that a less stringent form of short sale constraint should be enough to keep the
bubble. Kocherlakota (2008) shows that short sale constraints can arise endogenously. Hence, the model's
results could be more general.
9This could be the searching cost for the gambling opportunity, for instance.
12DV1t = Et(t;t+1)+Et(t;t+1DV1t+1), DV2t = Et(t;t+1ft+1)+Et(t;t+1DV2t+1). Denote









Rather than explicitly modeling the pricing behavior of the nancial intermediaries, we
adopt the reduced form specication of Chowdhury et al. (2006):
^ r
b




t is the real gross money market interest rate, and rb
t+1 is the real gross loan rate
which satises (rb
t+1   1)fe = ft+1. Note that we use the beginning of the period timing for
rb
t+1, so the above equation actually describes the evolution of current period credit spread.
(1+r) captures the interest rate passthrough which can be determined by various factors.10
When r =  1, the interest rate passthrough is zero.
2.3 Labor Market Structure and Wage Setting
Following Erceg et al. (2000), we assume that there is monopolistic competition in the labor
market. Each household j 2 (0;1) supplies a dierentiated labor type H(j) to the market








, where w 2 (1;1). The












aggregate nominal wage rate.
10See Ravenna and Walsh (2006), Nabar et al. (1993), Sander and Kleimeier (2004) for summaries of
theoretical discussions.
13There is nominal wage rigidity. More specically, a household can reset its nominal
wage rate with a xed probability 1   w in each period, where w 2 (0;1). The nominal
wage rate of those who cannot reoptimize face the wage rate from the last period, that is,





In each period, the household j gets a working salary (in real terms) from the rms wt(j)Ht(j).
Following Erceg et al. (2000), we assume that the government subsidizes the workers with
a subsidy rate l = 1
w 1 to eliminate monopolistic distortion from the labor market, so the
actual real labor income is (1+l)wt(j)Ht(j). The households also get prots from the rms.
More specically, they get prots mc
t from the consumption goods producers and prots
Nt[mt(!m
t )   ft] from the intermediate goods producers. Here we make use of the result of
Melitz (2003) that the rm with the average productivity !m
t earns the average prot in the
market. Besides the labor income and prot dividends from the rms, the households also
get the repayment of their deposits from the nancial intermediaries rm
t St, where St is the
amount of deposits in period t. Because of nominal wage rigidity, it is uncertain whether
the household j could reoptimize its wage. This could generate discrepancy in labor incomes
between those who can reset their wage rates and those who cannot. Hence, the decision on
saving and spending could dier across households. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we
assume that there are short-term securities with payos contingent on whether households
can reset their nominal wage. This ensures that the households are homogeneous in terms of
consumption, investment and deposit, though they are heterogeneous in terms of wage setting
and labor supply. Therefore, we can treat the household j as a representative household in
terms of consumption, investment, deposit and claims on prot. In sum, the household j's
wealth in each period is (1 + l)wt(j)Ht(j) + mc
t + Nt[mt(!m
t )   ft] + rm
t St + At(j), where
At(j) is the payo from the state-contingent securities. The households use their wealth
to consume Ct, invest Ne
t vt to build new production lines in the intermediate goods sector,
deposit St+1 to the nancial intermediaries and pay a lump-sum tax T L
t (dened in real terms)
14to the government. Therefore, the household budget constraint is Ct + Ne
t vt + St+1 + T L
t =
(1 + l)wt(j)Ht(j) + mc
t + Nt[mt(!m
t )   ft] + rm
t St + At(j).
The household chooses deposits (St+1) and labor supply (Ht) to maximize its expected in-
tertemporal utility Et1
s=ts tU(Cs;Hs), where  is the subjective discount factor, U(Cs;Hs)
is the periodic utility function in period s, Cs is the aggregate consumption, Hs is the labor
supply. Christiano et al. (2005) suggest that it is necessary to model habit formation to
capture the hump-shaped response of consumption to the monetary policy shock. Following
them, we model habit formation as the dependence of the current period's utility on the





where b is the parameter governing the relative importance of habit formation, l is the Frisch




where UCt  (Ct   bCt 1) 1   b[Et(Ct+1)   bCt] 1 is the marginal utility of consumption.
The FOC for deposit suggests that the marginal disutility of giving up current consumption
must be equal to the expected utility gain from the corresponding increase in next period's
consumption.
The households that can reset their wage rate choose the reset wage rate (W 
t ) to maximize
Et1
s=t(w)s tU(Csjt;Hsjt(j)), where Xsjt denotes the value of variable X in period s for the
















It determines the optimal reset wage rate and labor supply. In case there is no nominal
wage rigidity, the FOC for labor supply is UCt
Wt(j)
PC
s = Ht(j)1=l, which suggests that the
marginal disutility from working must be equal to the utility gain from the corresponding
increase in consumption. Note that this FOC is the same as the one in a perfectly competitive
labor market, as the distortion from labor market monopoly power is eliminated by the labor
15subsidy.
2.5 Market Clearing and Aggregate Accounting
Consumption goods market clearing requires that the output of consumption goods equals its
demand from consumption (Ct), investment (Ne
t fe), and marketing (PACt), where PACt 
pact(z)=P C
t is both the average and aggregate real price setting cost since the number of
consumption goods producers is normalized to one and the consumptions goods producers
are symmetric. More specically, we have Yt = Ct+Ne
t fe+PACt. Substituting the denition
of pact(z) into the market clearing condition, we get Yt = Ct + Ne
t fe +

2 (t   1)
2 ptyt=P C
t ,
where we have omitted the index z by applying the symmetry assumption across consumption
goods producers. Combining this equation with the demand function of the consumption
good producer yt = (
pt
PC




e = [1  








Each consumption goods producer demands Xt(z) = yt(z) = [
pt(z)
PC
t ] Yt amount of aggre-




t ] Yt is the total demand for the aggregate intermediate goods. Intermediate
goods market clearing then requires [
pt(z)
PC
t ] Yt = Xt.
The government budget constraint requires that the tax revenue equals the sum of all
subsidies, that is, T L
t = lwtLt+cYt+mP M
t Xt=P C
t . Here we use the result that total produc-









t = mP M
t Xt=P C
t .
Combining the government and household budget constraint, we get the aggregate account-
ing identity Ct+Ne
t vt+St+1 = wtLt+mc
t  cYt Ntft+rm
t St.11 Note that the total prot in
the intermediate goods sector net of subsidy is zero because the price is set to marginal cost
when there is a production subsidy. The total prot in the consumption goods sector net of
11The aggregate payo from the state-contingent securities is zero.
16subsidy is (mc
t   cYt). In the steady state without price adjustment it is also zero because
pricing markup is driven to one by the subsidy. However, the markup can deviate from one
if there is nominal price adjustment. In that case, (mc
t   cYt) will be dierent from zero.
Gambling asset demand is equal to the number of gamblers multiplied by the per gambler





t . Denote the periodically xed supply of the gambling asset





t = GS. Finally, loan
market equilibrium requires total saving equal to total lending: St+1 = Nr
t fe.
2.6 Monetary Policy Rules




t , where im
t is the gross nominal money market interest rate. The nominal money
market interest rate is set by the central bank according to a specic feedback rule. We
consider three dierent monetary policy rules in our analysis. The rst two rules involve
interest rate smoothing. One of those two rules does not react to output while the other one
does. More specically, one rule has the following form
^ i
m
t = ^ i
m
t 1 + (1   )(1:5t+1);
while the other rule is
^ i
m
t = ^ i
m
t 1 + (1   )(1:5t+1 + 0:1^ y
a
t+1);
where the smoothing parameter  is set to 0.8 so that the rst interest rate smoothing rule is
identical to the one used by Bilbiie et al. (2008), while the second rule is identical to the one
used by Christiano et al. (2005). The third monetary policy rule is a forward-looking Taylor
rule without interest rate smoothing:
^ i
m
t = 1:5t+1 + (0:5=4)^ y
a
t+1;
17where the 0.5 coecient of Taylor's original specication (Taylor, 1993) is divided by 4 since
the annualized ination and interest rate in Taylor's original specication are replaced by
quarterly ination and interest rate in the current paper.
Note that ^ ya
t is the deviation of GDP from its exible-price steady-state level. It is equal
to the theoretical output gap in case there is no technology shock, but will diverge from the
theoretical output gap if there is a technology shock to the economy. However, as noted
by Woodford (2003), the widely used empirical output gap estimated as the deviation of
output from a smooth trend can be very dierent from the theoretical output gap. Neiss and
Nelson (2005) estimate the theoretical output gap for the US, UK and Australia and nd
that the empirical output gap estimates from detrending methods are very dierent from
the theoretical output gap. Further, troughs in the HP-ltered output gap accord well with
the recessions documented by the NBER (Rudd and Whelan, 2007), which suggests that
by targeting the output gap generated by detrending methods such as the HP lter, central
banks are actually targeting output uctuations (^ ya
t) rather than the theory-consistent output
gap.
2.7 Model Summary
Table 1 summarizes the main equations of the model.12 The innite sum Vt dened in the
text is rewritten in recursive form in the table. The real prot equation of the consumption
goods sector in the table is the result of substituting the pricing equation and demand
function of the consumption goods sector into the real prot function in the text. The model
can be simplied by using the aggregate pricing equation of the consumption goods sector
P C
t = pt to substitute for P C






t) are not stationary in the model. To simulate the model, we have
to transform it to make all the variables in the model stationary. This is done by dening
the real price of aggregate intermediate goods by qt = P M
t =pt and using it to substitute the
nominal price levels in the model. The transformed model is summarized in Table 2. Note
12We do not include the specication of the monetary policy rule in the summary table to save space.
18that we follow Bilbiie et al. (2008) by using beginning of the period timing, so rb
t+1;ft+1;St+1
are actually determined in period t. The model can be closed by specifying a process of the
exogenous variable Zt and the parameters: Nr, , b, fe, few, , , w, , w, k, , l, r,
which we will do in the next section.
19Table 1: Model Summary
Fundamental value(gamble) fvt = gDV1t













Proportion of entrepreneur t = Ne
t =Nr
t
Denition of loan rate (rb
t+1   1)fe = ft+1
Evolution of loan rate ^ rb
t+1 = (1 + r)^ rm
t
Pricing (consumption goods) pt = tPM
t









Real prot (consumption goods) mc
t = f1 + c   1=t  






Aggregate pricing (consumption goods) PC
t = pt
Average individual productivity !m
t = [k=(k    + 1)]1=( 1)!
t
















Real Prot (intermediate goods) mt(!m


































Firm value (intermediate goods) vt = Etf
UCt+1
UCt t+1[mt+1(!m






Free entry (intermediate goods) vt = wt
Ztfew
Cuto condition (intermediate goods) mt(!
t) = ft
Survival rate t = (1=!
t)k
Number of rms Nt = t(Nt 1 + Ne
t 1)















Good market clearing (consumption) [1  





t ) 1Yt = Ct + Ne
t fe
Good market clearing (intermediate) [
pt
P C
t ] Yt = Xt
Loan market clearing St+1 = Nr
t fe
Aggregate accounting Ct + Ne
t vt + St+1 = wtLt + mc






Producer price ination t = pt=pt 1
(consumption goods)
1 DV1t  Et[1
s=t+1(t;ss t)] = Et(t;t+1) + Et(t;t+1DV1t+1).
2 DV2t  Et[1
s=t+1(t;ss tfs)] = Et(t;t+1ft+1) + Et(t;t+1DV2t+1).
3  t(z)  
n










t+1(z)2  (t+1(z)   1)
io
.
4 UCt  (Ct   bCt 1) 1   b[Et(Ct+1)   bCt] 1 is the marginal utility of consumption.
20Table 2: Transformed Model Summary
Fundamental value(gamble) fvt = gDV1t













Proportion of entrepreneur t = Ne
t =Nr
Denition of loan rate (rb
t+1   1)fe = ft+1
Evolution of loan rate ^ rb
t+1 = (1 + r)^ rm
t
Pricing (consumption goods) tqt = 1









Real prot (consumption goods) mc
t = f1 + c   1=t  

2 [t   1]
2gYt
Average individual productivity !m
t = [k=(k    + 1)]1=( 1)!
t
Real Prot (intermediate goods) mt(!m















Firm value (intermediate goods) vt = Etf
UCt+1
UCt t+1[mt+1(!m






Free entry (intermediate goods) vt = wt
Ztfew
Cuto condition (intermediate goods) mt(!
t) = ft
Survival rate t = (1=!
t)k
Number of rms Nt = t(Nt 1 + Ne
t 1)















Good market clearing (consumption) [1  

2 (t   1)
2]Yt = Ct + Ne
t fe
Good market clearing (intermediate) Yt = Xt
Loan market clearing St+1 = Nr
t fe
Aggregate accounting Ct + Ne
t vt + St+1 = wtLt + mc
t   cYt   Ntft + rm
t St
1 DV1t  Et[1
s=t+1(t;ss t)] = Et(t;t+1) + Et(t;t+1DV1t+1).
2 DV2t  Et[1
s=t+1(t;ss tfs)] = Et(t;t+1ft+1) + Et(t;t+1DV2t+1).
3  t(z)  
n










t+1(z)2  (t+1(z)   1)
io
.
4 UCt  (Ct   bCt 1) 1   b[Et(Ct+1)   bCt] 1 is the marginal utility of consumption.
213 Model Solution
3.1 Log-Linearization
We linearize the model in Table 2 by the method of Uhlig (1999). The result is summarized
in Table 3, where t 
pt pt 1
pt 1 is the CPI ination rate. Due to the symmetry assumption in
the consumption goods production sector, individual producer price ination is equal to the
average producer price ination. Therefore, we omit the index z in the notation. We omit z
in the notation of other variables in the consumption goods production sector for the same
reason. The labor supply equation in the nonlinear model is substituted by two equations.
One is the denition of nominal wage ination w
t . The other equation captures the wage
ination dynamics.13
13See Gali (2008) for derivation. The only dierence is that consumption utility in our model involves
habit formation and wage markup is driven to one by the subsidy.
22Table 3: Log Linear Model Summary
Fundamental value(gamble) c fvt = d DV 1t
Bubble size (fg + DV 2)b bbt + DV 2d DV 2t = 0
Asset price(gamble) ^ pr
t = b bbt + c fvt
Gambling asset market clearing fe ^ Nr
t   fe  ^ Ne
t = fe(1    ) ^ Pr
t
Proportion of entrepreneur ^ t = ^ Ne
t   ^ Nr
t
Denition of loan rate  rbfe^ rb
t+1 =  f ^ ft+1
Evolution of loan rate ^ rb
t+1 = (1 + r)^ rm
t
Pricing (consumption goods) ^ qt =  ^ t
Markup (consumption goods) t = Et(t+1)  

 ^ t
Real prot (consumption goods) ^ mc
t = (   1)^ t + ^ Yt
Average individual productivity ^ !m
t = ^ !
t
Real Prot (intermediate goods) ^ mt(!m
t ) = ^ qt + (1   )( ^ wt   ^ !m
t   ^ Zt) + ^ Xt
^ mt(!
t) = ^ qt + (1   )( ^ wt   ^ !
t   ^ Zt) + ^ Xt
Aggregate pricing (intermediate goods) ^ qt = 1
1  ^ Nt + ^ wt   ^ !m
t   ^ Zt
Firm value (intermediate goods) ^ UCt + ^ vt = Et(^ UCt+1) + Et(^ t+1) +  
 m( !
m)





^ ft+1 +  Et(^ vt+1)
Free entry (intermediate goods) ^ vt = ^ wt   ^ Zt
Cuto condition (intermediate goods) ^ mt(!
t) = ^ ft
Survival rate ^ t =  k^ !
t
Number of rms ^ Nt = ^ t +   ^ Nt 1 + (1    ) ^ Ne
t 1
Euler equation (deposit) ^ UCt = Et(^ UCt+1) + Et(^ rm
t+1)
Labor supply w
t   t = ^ wt   ^ wt 1
w
t = Etw
t+1   w( ^ wt   1
l
^ Lt + ^ UCt)
Good market clearing (consumption)  Y ^ Yt =  C ^ Ct +  Nefe ^ Ne
t
Good market clearing (intermediate) ^ Xt = ^ Yt
Loan market clearing ^ St+1 = ^ Nr
t
Aggregate accounting  C ^ Ct +  Ne v( ^ Ne
t + ^ vt) +  S ^ St+1 =  w L( ^ wt + ^ Lt)
+ mc(^ mc
t   ^ Yt)    N  f( ^ Nt + ^ ft) +  rm  S(^ rm
t + ^ St)
1 d DV 1t = (1   )Et(^ UCt+1   ^ UCt) + Et(^ UCt+1   ^ UCt + d DV 1t+1).
2 d DV 2t = (1   )Et(^ UCt+1   ^ UCt + ^ ft+1) + Et(^ UCt+1   ^ UCt + d DV 2t+1).
3 ^ UCt =
bEt( ^ Ct+1) (1+b
2) ^ Ct+b ^ Ct 1






As in the standard business cycle model, the periods are interpreted as quarters. The house-
hold discount factor  is set to 1/1.0025, which implies that the US steady-state monetary
policy rate is 1% per annum (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007; Curdia and Woodford, 2010).
Habit formation parameter b is set to 0.65, the value estimated by Christiano et al. (2005).
We set elasticities  =  = 3:8 to t the U.S. plant and macro trade data (Ghironi and
23Melitz, 2005; Bilbiie et al., 2008). Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), we calibrate the
Pareto distribution shape parameter k to match the standard deviation of log US plant sales
which is 1.67 according to Bernard et al. (2003). We follow Bilbiie et al. (2008) by setting
the Frisch elasticity to l = 2 and the price stickiness parameter to  = 77. The weight of
labor disutility  is calibrated to generate a steady-state labor eect level of one regardless
of the Frisch elasticity. Following Erceg et al. (2000), we set elasticity of labor w to 4 and
sticky wage parameter w to 0.75. Parameter governing interest rate passthrough, r , is set
to 0.3, the value estimated for the US by Chowdhury et al. (2006). Steady-state lending rate
is set to (1:02)1=4 times the monetary policy rate, reecting the 2% US steady-state annual
credit spread (Curdia and Woodford, 2010). We normalize the sunk cost in consumption
goods fe to 1 since its level does not aect the coecients of the impulse response functions.
Steady-state intermediate goods producer survival rate is set to 0.975, the same number as
the one specied in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008). The dierence is
that the rms' survival rate is xed in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008)
while it can deviate from the steady-state level in our model. We require the calibrated
steady-state variables to capture the US private debt to GDP ratio (St=ya
t), 80% per annum
or 3.2 per quarter (Curdia and Woodford, 2010).14 We set  = 0:9, fg = 0:934363, so that
there is no bubble in the steady state. The periodic supply of the gambling asset GS is
normalized to 1 since it does not aect the impulse response function.15 Following King and
Rebelo (1999) and Bilbiie et al. (2008), we assume that the aggregate productivity evolves
as follows: lnZt = 0:979lnZt 1 + e, where e is an i.i.d. random shock with variance 2.
14The real GDP level ya
t is dened as the sum of consumption (Ct) and investment (Ne
t vt).
15What matters for the impulse responses is the product of steady-state price and periodic supply of the
gambling asset. This product is determined by the steady-state gambling asset market clearing condition,
given the numerical values of our other parameters.
244 Impulse Responses
We consider the impulse responses of the variables to two types of shocks: an expansionary
monetary policy shock and a negative productivity shock. We focus on the variables related
to the riskiness of loan portfolios for nancial intermediaries. More specically, we report and
discuss the impulse responses of the number of entrepreneurial entry, the number of entering
gamblers, the survival rate of entrepreneurs, the bubble size and the gambling asset price. We
also report the impulse responses of two other variables (the average prot of intermediate
goods producers and the required periodic repayment to nancial intermediaries) since they
are closely related to investors' entry decisions. Interested readers can refer to the gures in
the appendices for the impulse responses of all the other variables in the model.
4.1 Impulse Responses to An Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of the key variables (percentage deviations from the
steady-state levels) to a one-percent unexpected decrease in the net nominal money market
interest rate.16 The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The
responses are normalized so that one denotes one percent. The dashed curves with square
markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to
the responses under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted
curves with round markers correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor
rule.
The impulse responses are qualitatively similar under all three interest rate rules. More
specically, after the shock, entrepreneurial entry increases in the rst few quarters, and then
starts to decline and persistently stays below the steady-state level for a long period of time.
This result is in sharp contrast to the result of Bilbiie et al. (2008). Bilbiie et al. (2008) who
nd that the expansionary monetary policy shock immediately reduces rm entry if entry
16See gure A1 for impulse responses of all variables.
25incurs sunk investment in eective labor. Furthermore, they nd rm entry persistently stays
above the steady-state level after the rst few periods. As noted by Rotemberg (2008), the
initial decline in rm entry in Bilbiie et al. (2008) comes from the procyclical rise in the real
wage, which makes entry more expensive and future returns less attractive. Particularly,
average prot in the intermediate goods sector decreases after the shock despite the increase
in demand. If the nominal wage is sticky, the real wage is less procyclical and entry is less
costly. Additionally, average prots in the near future rise. This further encourages entry.
Our result conrms Rotemberg's conjecture that an expansionary monetary policy shock
stimulates entry on impact when a realistic level of wage rigidity is introduced into the model.
Holding the number of producers constant, the increase in demand also increases protability
in the current period. This makes debt repayment easier and raises the survival rate of
intermediate goods rms. Both the increase in rm survival rate and entrepreneurial entry
in the initial period increase the number of producers in the future. Intensied competition
not only reduces sales of each individual intermediate goods producer but also reduces the
price of intermediate goods relative to consumption goods. This is because a one-percent
decrease in the price of aggregate intermediate goods only leads to a less-than-one-percent
decrease in the price of aggregate consumption goods when prices in the consumption goods
sector are sticky. As a result, future prots in real terms decrease, leading to lower levels of
entrepreneurial entry.
The number of gamblers in the pool of new loan applicants is persistently higher than the
steady-state level after the shock. This is because the unexpected decline in the nominal in-
terest rate persistently reduces required periodic repayments to the nancial intermediaries.17
Lower periodic repayments lead to higher expected cash ows from the gamble which attracts
more gamblers. The increase in the number of gamblers pushes up the price of the gambling
asset. Limited liability encourages excessive risk-taking behavior. Therefore, the rise in the
gambling asset price is more than the rise in its fundamental value. In other words, the
bubble size becomes larger than one. Recall that the expected repayment from gamblers
17Required periodic repayments increase in the initial periods. However, the eect of the persistent reduc-
tion in future required periodic repayments dominates the changes in the net present value of cash ows.
26to the nancial intermediaries is inversely related to the bubble size. Therefore, after the
expansionary monetary policy shock, the expected loss from lending to gamblers will be per-
sistently higher than the steady-state level. Figure 2 suggests that the initial rise in the
number of entrepreneurs quantitatively dominates the initial rise in the number of gamblers.
Therefore, the proportion of entrepreneurs in the borrower pool initially increases. However,
the initial increase in the proportion of entrepreneurs does not last long. Instead, the pro-
portion of entrepreneurs persistently stays below the steady-state level in the long run. A
persistently-higher-than-steady-state expected loss from lending to gamblers together with a
persistently-higher-than-steady-state proportion of gamblers in the borrower pool accumu-
lates a signicant risk in the nancial sector. Interestingly, the eect of the monetary policy
shock on the accumulation of long run nancial risk is quantitatively much more signicant
when the interest rate rule does not react to output uctuations. This is because under the
rules reacting to the output uctuation, initial rise in entrepreneurial entry is reduced by the
central bank's action to cut aggregate demand. The lower initial rise in entrepreneurial entry
reduces the future numbers of competitors in the market, making entry in the following pe-
riods more attractive. Taylor (2009) argues that keeping the policy interest rate persistently
lower than the level implied by the Taylor rule may be a source of nancial crisis. We nd
that if the economy is hit by an expansionary monetary policy shock and the central bank
does not react to output uctuations, the nominal money market interest rate will be per-
sistently lower than the level implied by the forward-looking Taylor rule.18 As we discussed,
not reacting to output uctuations leads to a more signicant long-run nancial risk. In this
sense, our ndings in this section are consistent with Taylor's argument. However, we shall
see in the next subsection, sticking to the Taylor rule is not sucient to eliminate nancial
crises.
18See gure A1.
274.2 Impulse Responses to A Negative Productivity Shock
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of the key variables (percentage deviations from the
steady-state levels) to a one-standard-deviation19 decrease in aggregate productivity.20 The
rst observation is that impulse responses are very similar under the two interest rate rules
reacting to output uctuations. Secondly, impulse responses under the two rules reacting
to output uctuations are very dierent from the ones under the the interest rate rule not
reacting to output uctuations. More specically, we have the following key results.
When the interest rate rule reacts to output uctuations, entrepreneurial entry initially
increases. By contrast, entrepreneurial entry initially decreases when the interest rate rule
does not react to output uctuations. The initial decrease in aggregate productivity aects
entrepreneurial entry through two channels. The rst one is the direct prot channel :
persistently-lower-than-steady-state aggregate productivity can directly reduce future prof-
itability of intermediate goods production, which deters entrepreneurial entry. The second
channel is the interest rate channel: the real money market interest rate decreases af-
ter the shock under all three interest rate rules. The reduction in the real money market
rate reduces future real loan rates and required periodic repayments, making entrepreneurial
entry more attractive. Additionally, lower real money market rates increase demand. This
reduces the negative eect of the productivity shock on production and prots and further
encourages entrepreneurial entry. The net eect of the negative aggregate productivity shock
on entrepreneurial entry depends on the size of the osetting eects. If the interest rate rules
react to output uctuations, the interest rate channel dominates on impact and the rm value
exceeds the sunk cost of investment, which means that entrepreneurial entry must increase
to preserve the free entry condition in the intermediate goods sector. By contrast, if the
interest rate rule does not react to output uctuations, the direct prot channel dominates
on impact, leading to an immediate reduction in entrepreneurial entry.
The initial increases in entrepreneurial entry under the two interest rate rules reacting to
19The standard deviation of aggregate productivity shock is set to 0.0012, the number used in King and
Rebelo (1999).
20See gure A2 for impulse responses of all variables.
28output uctuations do not last long and are followed by persistently-lower-than-steady-state
numbers of entrepreneurial entry. This is because the initial rise in entrepreneurial entry
makes the number of intermediate goods producers persistently higher than the steady-state
number. Competition reduces future protability and deters entry. By contrast, under
the interest rate rule not reacting to output uctuation, due to the initial decrease in en-
trepreneurial entry, the number of intermediate goods producers is persistently below the
steady-state value. Less competition attracts entry, so entrepreneurial entry quickly recovers
and remains at higher-than-steady-state values for a long period of time.
The rm survival rate initially increases after the negative aggregate productivity shock
under the interest rate rules reacting to output uctuations whereas it initially decreases
under the interest rate rule not reacting to output uctuations. The responses of the rm
survival rate become quantitatively very small after ve years under all interest rate rules.
Similar to entrepreneurial entry, the rm survival rate is also aected by the bad produc-
tivity shock through two channels: the direct prot channel and the interest rate channel.
Lower productivity reduces prots while the lower interest rate increases prots by increasing
demand.21 If the interest rate rule reacts to output uctuations, the interest rate channel
initially dominates, leading to a higher rm survival rate. Conversely, if the interest rate rule
does not react to output uctuations, the direct prot channel dominates on impact. As a
result, the rm survival rate decreases. A higher survival rate of the rms also increases the
future number of competitors and deters entrepreneurial entry in the long run.
The number of gamblers initially increases under all three dierent monetary policy rules.
However, the initial rise in the number of gamblers is small and transitory if the central bank
does not react to output uctuations. By contrast, the initial rise in the number of gamblers
is large and persistent if the central bank does react to output uctuations. Consequently,
the bubble size is persistently higher if the central bank reacts to output uctuations. The
intuition is as follows. Reduction in real interest rates reduces future required repayments and
increases cash ows from gambling. This attracts gamblers. Excessive risk-taking behavior
21Note that required repayment is predetermined when the shock hits, so the cut in real interest rate does
not work through aecting the required repayment in the initial period.
29by the gamblers increases the bubble size. If the central bank tries to avoid the current
recession by cutting the interest rate, it lowers the real interest rate more than when it does
not care about output uctuations. As a result, cash ows from gambling increase more, and
more gamblers enter the market, leading to a larger size of the bubble. A larger bubble size
suggests a higher expected loss from lending to gamblers. Together with a higher proportion
of gamblers in the borrower pool, it imposes a signicant risk to the nancial sector. The
results suggest that sticking to a Taylor rule is not sucient to eliminate nancial crises.
Actually, in case the economy is hit by a negative productivity shock, deviating from the
Taylor rule by not reacting to output uctuations can reduce the long-run nancial risk.
5 Sticky Interest Rate Passthrough
In our benchmark model, the passthrough from changes in money market rate to the loan
rate is more than one. It is interesting to see what happens if we have a lower interest rate
passthrough. Particularly, many studies nd that the interest rate passthrough is sticky in
Europe. In this section, we investigate the implication of sticky interest rate passthrough in
our model. More specically, we produce impulse responses of the variables to the shocks
with r =  0:8 which implies an interest rate passthrough of 0.2, the value estimated by
Chowdhury et al. (2006) for France.
5.1 Impulse Responses to An Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 4 displays the impulse responses of key variables after a one-percent unexpected
decrease in net nominal money market rate.22 The qualitative results are similar to the
benchmark model. The number of entrepreneurial entry initially rises and then remains at
levels lower than the steady-state value for a long time. Intermediate rm survival rate
initially rises, followed by quantitatively negligible responses. The number of gamblers in the
borrower pool increases and stays at levels higher than the steady-state level for a long time.
22See gure A3 for impulse responses of all variables.
30The proportion of entrepreneurs initially increases, starts to decline after a short period and
remains at levels lower than the steady-state level for a long time. Bubble size and real asset
price increase, and persistently stay at levels higher than the steady-state levels.
Two notable dierences from the benchmark model are: variables converge to their steady-
state levels faster than in the benchmark model; the quantitative responses are less dierent
under the three interest rate rules than in the benchmark model. This is because now the
dierences in the eects of initial change in money market rate are narrowed down by the
sticky interest passthrough when transmitted to the intermediate goods sector.
5.2 Impulse Responses to A Negative Productivity Shock
Figure 5 displays the impulse responses of key variables after a one-standard-deviation neg-
ative productivity shock.23 As in the benchmark model, entrepreneurial entry initially in-
creases, then declines to a level lower than the steady-state level and slowly recovers when
interest rate rules react to output uctuation. The dierence is that the initial increase in
entrepreneurial entry is smaller, leading to smaller numbers of future competitors in the inter-
mediate goods sector. Hence, the proportion of entrepreneurs in the borrower pool converges
faster to the steady-state level than in the benchmark model. The bubble size remains above
the steady state for more than ve years if the interest rate rule reacts to output uctuation.
However, both size and duration of the bubble are smaller in magnitude than in the bench-
mark model. Therefore, when the interest rate passthrough is sticky, the economy shocked
by a negative productivity shock is less prone to long run nancial crash.
6 Conclusion
Our model demonstrates that large unexpected expansionary monetary policy shocks could
trigger nancial crises in the long run. Interestingly, the central bank's reaction to output
uctuations can reduce the negative eect of the unexpected reduction in money market
23See gure A4 for impulse responses of all variables.
31interest rate on the long-run nancial stability. As we know, the Taylor rule includes the
central bank's reaction to output uctuations. In this sense, sticking to the Taylor rule can
help reduce the long-run nancial risk. However, a central bank's monetary policy aimed at
smoothing output uctuations can persistently worsen the borrower pool faced by nancial
intermediaries in the long run if the economy is hit by a negative aggregate productivity
shock. That is, it will persistently increase the proportion of gamblers in the pool of new
loan applicants. Furthermore, the expected loss from lending to each gambler is persistently
higher than the steady-state level under such a policy. If the central bank only responds to
ination, the negative eect of the aggregate productivity shock on the borrower pool is more
transitory but larger in magnitude, which suggests that the nancial intermediaries have to
temporarily withstand higher pressure. As a tradeo, they can avoid persistent future losses
if they survive the current stress. The traditional business cycle view of nancial crises24
suggests that a sharp drop in the productivity of the real sector could generate a bank run.
Hence it is tempting for governments to intervene to avoid nancial crises. However, our
analysis suggests that policies that try to reduce the probability of a current crisis may
create a future crisis in the long run.
24See Allen and Gale (2007) for a summary.
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33Figure 2: Impulse Responses After An Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock, Key Variables
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Proportion of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
35Figure 3: Impulse Responses After A Negative Productivity Shock, Key Variables
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Proportion of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
36Impulse Responses After A Negative Productivity Shock, Key Variables (Continued)
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
37Figure 4: Sticky Interest Rate Passthrough and Impulse Responses After An Expansionary
Monetary Policy Shock, Key Variables
 












0 5 10 15 20








0 5 10 15 20









0 5 10 15 20









0 5 10 15 20
Proportion of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
38Sticky Interest Rate Passthrough and Impulse Responses After An Expansionary Monetary
Policy Shock, Key Variables (Continued)
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
39Figure 5: Sticky Interest Rate Passthrough and Impulse Responses After A Negative Pro-
ductivity Shock, Key Variables
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Proportion of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
40Sticky Interest Rate Passthrough and Impulse Responses After A Negative Productivity
Shock, Key Variables (Continued)
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Entry of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Markup (consumption 
goods) 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
48Figure A2: Impulse Responses After A Negative Aggregate Productivity Shock
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Entry of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
49Impulse Responses After A Negative Aggregate Productivity Shock (Continued)
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Markup (consumption 
goods) 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Entry of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Entry of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves with
square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule without
reacting to output uctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses under the
interest smoothing rule reacting to output uctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond
to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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